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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANK H. FULLMER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

PARLEY

12969

J. BAKER,

Defendant-Appellctnt.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in contract.

DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT
riff.

The lower court granted judgment in favor of the plain-

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the lower court's judgment
in his favor.

FACTS
Plaintiff does not agree with defendant's statement of
facts as it is incomplete and not a presentation of the facts
in tht light most favorable to the verdict as is required on ap]X'al. The following statement of facts is therefore submitted:
1

Defendant Baker is the president of "I F C,,

ally bankrupt Utah corporation (R.17). Th~ ~l~in:i~/'~r
,arr
. d
t racror, became acquamte
with the defendant h h' ··
w en ud
do some remodeling of some of the restaurants to Wh'IC h]f,"
had granted franchises.
·
On several occasions defendant represented to plain:
that I.F.C. was "going to go public." (R. 1, 101; Ex. J.D
In reliance upon those representations the plaintiff paid 1
fendant. $5,000 for which he was to receive 20,000 sham,
defendant's own I.F.C. stock (R. 69, 74). Several weeks~·
paying the $ 5 ,000 the defendant presented to plaintiff awric.
agreement reflecting the transaction ( R. 67, 80). The a@t
ment ( R. 9) had been drafted by the defendant (R. 941..
provided in paragraph 2 for delivery of the shares "withm.:
year from the date" of the agreement (March 15, 19701.
paragraph 3, that the shares would be "free from all en(U[
brances," and in paragraph 4, that the shares would be "ire;
erly endorsed for transfer." When he signed the agreem[
plaintiff asked for the stock certificate. Defendant replied tl;
the certificate would be mailed ( R. 68, 7 6) .
Defendant neither mailed the certificate as prorniseo i
took any steps, such as a simple diary date, to see that rlac
tiff received his shares in I.F.C. within the maximum t!IT
provided by the agreement (R. 95-96).
Defendant had done nothing to inform plaintiff of k
whereabouts during the year following the making of rr
agreement. The agreement represented defendant as ~c
from Provo ( R. 9) . But after time for performance had lar
. "ff to searc h out de1enu"
it later became necessary for plamt1
at his new location in Orem (Ex. 3-P) ·

2

Plaintiff's name was never entered on the corporate records as a shareholder and plaintiff never received any communication from I.F.C., such as notice of a shareholders meetin.:;, prior to filing this action ( R. 172, 68, 69). After the
curiipiaint was filed, however, the defendant phoned plaintiff
and invited him to a directors meeting ( R. 69, 82).
The shares of I.F.C. were never registered with the state
or ftderal government (R. l 7a, 60, 73).
Prior to filing this suit plaintiff's attorney wrote defendant pointing out defendant's total non-performance, demandmg reurn of the $5,000 and offering to work out repayment
terms. Defendant did not bother to respond to that letter (R.
1S, 84). A second letter (Ex. 3-P) was then sent to defendant
to which defendant's attorney eventually responded (R. 85,

Ex. 4-PJ.
At trial defendant offered to produce the shares which
11tre the subject of the parties' agreement and which defendant claimed would constitute performance by him (Ex. 2-P).
The stock certificate offered was clearly deficient. It
still bore the name of the defendant and the endorsement on
the back was improper and incomplete in several material respects: it was incomplete as to the number of shares being
transferred, if any; it was incomplete as to the appointment of
a transfer agent; and it was neither witnessed nor dated. Indeed, the only blanks filled in, plaintiff's name and defendant's signature, had been entered by defendant in pencil (R.
92; Ex. 2-P) !

3

-The trial court heard the evidence and argum
ent ot
counsel, allowed additional time for legal memorand .
.
.
a~
then found all issues rn favor of the plaintiff.
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of La~
are found in the appeal record at R. 17-19. Among other
things the court found that the defendant had materiallr
breached the agreement of March 15, 1970 in every respec;,
that plaintiff had fully performed, and that plaintiff was there
fore entitled to rescind the agreement and have his $5,00~
returned.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

DEFENDANT NEVER MADE A PROPER OR
TIMELY TENDER OF PERFORMANCE
Defendant argues without supporting authority or reason,
that time was not the essence of the parties' agreement because
the contract did not so specifically state. Defendant even claims
at page 4 of his brief that "the law is clear" in this regard.
The contract, however, is clear and unambiguous as re·
gards the time for performance.

"2. Baker agrees to convey to Fullmer within one
year from the date hereof {March 15, 1970} 20,00~
shares of . . . 1.F.C. . . . ." (R. 9).
The tender of performance, therefore, was required within
· s1·1ent as to
the time already stated. Only when a contract 1s
the time of performance is one allowed, what defendant now
argues, a reasonable time for performance. 17 A C.J.S. 6S:

Contracts § 482 (1963).

4

Defendant's claim at page 4 of his brief that failure to
JJiver the shares within the year was "inadvertent" is unsupported by the record; the evidence is to the contrary. Defendant was extremely indifferent, if not scheming, with regard
ro his contractual obligations. He never made so much as a
srniple diary record to assure delivery of the shares within the
maxim um time required ( R. 95, 96) . He moved from Provo
to Orem after making the contract and did not inform plaintiff of his whereabouts (R. 9, Ex. 3-P). He could easily have
mailed the shares to plaintiff as promised but he did not ( R.
68, 76) . Indeed defendant was so indifferent to plaintiff's intercsts that he ignored even the first demand letter from plaintiff's attorney ( R. 18, 84-85).
Defendant again misstates the facts at page 7 of his brief
where he speaks of the plaintiff's intention "not to perform."
Such a statement is incredible in light of the fact that plaintiff
had fully performed every obligation of the contract as found
by the trial court (R. 18 - Finding of Fact No. 16).
Defendant's argument under Point I is also fatally defective in that it assumes a critical element the trial court specifically rejected: that a proper tender was ever made. A tender
of performance is never sufficient unless it is tender in accordance with the terms of the contract.
"(A} tender which does not conform to the contract
is the same as no tender at all. The tenderer must do
and offer everything that is necessary on his part to
complete the transaction, and must fairly make known
his purpose without ambiguity.

* * *

"The tender . . . must be definite and certain in
character .
" 17 A C.J.S. 684, 685, Contracts § 486

(1963).

5

Defendant's tender was indefinite, ambiguous d
an not
.
rn conformance with what the contract required· Th
.
·
e Stork
certificate offered at trial had never even been seen by th .
1
epain
tiff prior to that time ( R. 18, Finding 15); it was made 0 ·
.

Ut tn

the defendant's name and the claimed endorsement on tht
back was pencilled in, incomplete, and therefore ambiguous IIl
several material aspects (Ex. 2-P) . This lead the trial coun •
to properly conclude:

"5. The certificate . . . produced at trial by the de.
fendant was incompletely and ineffectively endorsed."
(R. 18-19).
Even if the endorsement had been legally sufficient me
shares themselves did not conform with the contract terms as
they were not "free from all encumbrances" as required 01
paragraph 4 of the parties' agreement (R. 19, Conclusion No.
6) . This is discussed further under Point III of this brief.
Defendant's claimed tender was also untimely:

"In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, it~
no defense to an action for breach of contract that per·
formance was tendered after the action was commenc·
ed." 17 A C.J.S. 683, Contracts § 482 ( 1963).
With regard to defendant's duty under paragraph 2 of me
agreement to "convey to Fullmer within one year," the trial
court found that:
"7. The defendant never transferred or conveyed to
the plaintiff . . . any shares of . . . I.F.C." (R. 191
(Italics added).
Defense counsel admitted to the propriety of that Findini.
as concerns the total lack of any conveyance prior to ma'l ' al
evidenced by its own proffered Conclusion of Law No. 7 whi~
incorporates all of the above language ( R. 25) ·

6

1

The court recognized early that there was a question
whether a tender has been made (R. 61) and invited defense
counsel to offer its evidence as it had the burden of proving
a proper tender ( R. 64) . The court made no Conclusions of
Law that there was a proper tender ( R. 18, 19). Defense
counsel in his motion to amend the Conclusions of Law moved
for a Conclusion that a proper tender had been made, (R. 25)
but the trial court rejected that suggested amendment (R.

33,34).
Defendant's tender being both improper and untimely it
was legally no tender at all.
POINT

II

DEFENDANT'S TOTAL NON-PERFORMANCE
GAVE PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO ELECT RESCISSION OR SUE FOR DAMAGES.
Defendant's argument in Point II totally ignores the wellestablished principle of election of remedies by claiming plaintiff's only remedy for defendant's total breach was damages.
In Pool v. Motter, 55 Utah 288, 185 P. 714, 715 ( 1919)
the court set forth what it recognized as the "general rule"
with regard to rescission:

"If a contract is entire, and remains executory in whole
or in part, and one party fails to perform what it is his
duty to do under the contract, and the other party is
not in default, the latter may rescind the contract."
In Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah 264,
67 P.2d 632 (1937) the appellant challenged, as does the defendant-appellant in this case, the right to rescind a contract
simply for breach thereof. The court in Hintze reaffirmed the
right to rescind the contract or recover damages:

7

"(The} breach of . . . a covenant which goes h
.
w h o l e cons1"d eratton
o f a contract, gives the in'tot l.
.
h
. d
)Uftc
party t he rig t to rescm a contract, or to treat it Ji
broken and to recover damages for a total breach." 6.
P.2d at 638.
The requisite conditions of Pool v. Motter and Sidne

)

Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze also exist in this case: plain.
tiff had fully performed under the contract, defendant hai
failed totally to perform as required, the defendant's breach
in every material respect went to the whole consideration ol
the contract, and plaintiff made a proper election to rescind.
The trial court's Findings were therefore totally within the
framework of long-established legal principles:
"2. Defendant's breach constituted a material anc
essential obligation to be performed under the con
tract which was not severable.

* * *

"4. Plaintiff was properly entitled to rescind the
agreement . . . . " (R. 18).
Nothing hampered defendant's ability to perform

:li

required other than his own apparent indifference to the obliga·
tions which flowed from the agreement he himself drafted
He should not now be heard to complain of the legal canst
quences brought about by his own inaction. Defendant's con·
duct falls within the admonition of Lawson v. Woodmen ol

the World, 88 Utah 267, 53 P.2d 432, 435 (1936):
"They seek to accept the benefits of the contract, but
avoid the full force of its obligations. This they can
not do."

8

POINT

III

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT
THE UNREGISTERED SHARES OF I.F.C. WERE
ENCUMBERED.

Defendant drafted the agreement which is the subject of
this suit ( R. 17, 94). Paragraph 3 of that agreement represented and warranted that the shares to be conveyed would
be "free from all encumbrances." Defendant challenges in
Point III the trial court's Conclusion of Law No. 6 (R. 19)
that the shares were not free from encumbrances.
The trial court's conclusion that the shares were not
free from encumbrances was based upon a realistic look at
the consequences of owning unregistered securities. A basic
principle under both the state and federal securities acts is that
all shares must be registered unless entitled to some exemption,
which exemption the seller of unregisterd securities has the
burden of proving. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 provides:
"It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any
security in this state unless it is registered under this
act or the security or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14."

Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 ( 15 U.S.C. §77e)
is similar to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 and confers federal
jurisdiction over any transaction which makes use of the mails
or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Federal jurisdiction is easily acquired. In Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke
& Co., 134 F.2d 875 ( 2d Cir. 1943) the court upheld federal
jurisdiction over a transaction in which the only element of
interstate commerce was use of the mails for delivery of the
certificates after the transaction had been consummated without the use of any other element of interstate commerce.

9

A discontented purchaser of unregistered securit'
1es nttu
only plead the unregistered status of the shares and th
shift the heavy burden of proof upon the seller. Surely

:
0

who can sell his securities only under threat of potential legai
action by the state or federal government or the purchaser he
shares which are "encumbered" in every practical applicatioo
of the word.
The Federal Securities and Exchange Commission hai
established rules directed

to

transactions in unregistered se

curities. The obvious intent and effect of these rules is to en
cumber or hinder, the free trading of unregistered securitic;
Rule 144 of the Securities and Exchange Commission is onl!
one of several rules which present major limitations on trading
unregistered securities. Among the several requirements oi
Rule 144 are the following:
(1) The person for whose account the securities ait

sold must have been the beneficial owner of the
securities for a period of at least two years prior
to the sale, and

(2) There must be available at the time of the salt
"adequate current public information" with re
spect to the issuer of the securities (in this case.
I.F.C. Corporation).
Surely one who owns property which he cannot legall1
resell for a minimum of two years owns property which ii
"encumbered."
Likewise, where a shareholder, such as plaintiff woula
have been, has no power or authority to make available
· m
· format10n
· " a b ou t the issuer com·
"adequate current pu bl 1c
pany he is in an encumbered position with regard to
securities.

10

tho~

In 1966 a practICmg lawyer and law professor, Edward

E. Shea, published an article dealing with the practical problems inherent in any sale of unregistered securities. His article
appeared in 13 Univ. of Detroit Law Journal 572 and was
titled: "A Practical Look at the Securities Laws Restrictions on
Sales by Owners of Unregistered Stock." The article is well
written and detailed. It was considered by Judge Baldwin in
the judgment he rendered for plaintiff. Its conclusion is directed to practicing lawyers and sounds a warning:
"Unless and until amendments such as those discussed
. . . are adopted, even the most practical lawyer will
be unable to remove all complications faced by his
clients who own or wish to purchase unregistered
stock." Id. at 602 (Italics added.)
Where, as attorney Shea warns, even the "most practical
lawyer" will have trouble with the legal complications of a
transaction in unregistered securities, the same transaction is
surely much more cumbersome and fraught with legal implications where handled by a layman.
The trial court wisely kept sight of these facts in holding
the I.F.C. securities were not free from encumbrances as re·
quired by the contract.
Defendant argues a non sequitur in Point III by claiming
that because the word "encumbrance" is most often applied to
real property transactions it has no application to the contract
he himself drafted for the sale of personal property.
To have warranted that the shares would be "free from all
encumbrances" and then argue that such language should be
ignored is blatantly inconsistent and self-serving.

11

•
The best argument defendant can make is th .
~ ~
f rom all encumbrances" is ambiguous. That ' however, wou[:"

only mean that the ambiguity should be construed against
· tk'
defendant, the drafter of the instrument and in fav f •·
'
or 0 tn'
plaintiff thus supporting the trial court's i'udgment · Gz11n,m1.
· 1:'

Walton. 22 Utah 2d 196, 459 P.2d 467, 469 (1969).

In determining the meaning to be applied to "free from
all encumbrances" the trial court considered, in addition tu
those things already mentioned, the advice of Plain City lrri,1i
tion Co. v. Hooper Irrigation Co., 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P.1u
625 ( 1960):
'The beginning point of interpretation of a contract 1,
an examination of the language used in accordan(t
with the ordinary and usual meaning of the wora<
used . . . . " 356 P.2d at 627.
The ordinary and usual meaning of "encumbrance" ~
defined by Webster is:

"1. State of being encumbered; perplexity; troublt
2. That which encumbers; a burden that impedes"'
tion or motion, or renders it difficult or laborio11J'
impediment." Websters New International Dictionar,
843 ( 2d Ed. 195 7) (Italics added.)
The trial court applied the ordinary and usual meanin~

of "encumbrance" to the transaction between the parties an~
properly found the defendant could not produce shares whirr
·were "free from all encumbrances" as required by the parttei
agreement. That decision was realistic and based upon prope:
legal principles and should therefore be affirmed.

12

'

CONCLUSION
The agreement between the parties was drafted by the
Jefrndant. Plaintiff had fully performed under that agreement
even prior to his signing by paying $5,000 to defendant. The
agreement required defendant to convey to plaintiff properly
endorsed unencumbered shares by March 15, 1971. On that
date defendant had done nothing towards performance. He
had even moved out of the town where the agreement represented he lived without informing plaintiff. He was forced to
admit at trial he never took any steps even to remind him of
his duty of performance.
Defendant's complaints to this court are nothing more
than uphappiness with the proper legal consequences of his
own disinterest in keeping his part of the bargain. Had he
been even half as concerned with his obligations after taking
plaintiff's money this appeal would not now be before this
court.
The trial court applied proper principles of Utah law to
the credible facts developed at trial. Its judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LOWELL N. HAWKES of
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintif!-Respondent
7th Floor, Continental .Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Served the foregoing Brief by mailing two copies thereof
to Ralph ]. Marsh, Deseret Buildi~g, S~l~!;t City, Utan
84111, Attorney for Appellant, this -----'--'------- day of Fe~
ruary, 1973.
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